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hisessay written for The Na Plgrave dictionary ofonomics.
providesseIectl ye ano interpretive account of the devaiopmert of
thought on intarnatonal financial questions. Attention is 4ocusad on
the process of international adjustment and on theproDer definition of
external balance. Since the first descriptions of theonce—specie—flow
mechanism in Humes time, the definition of external balancehas evolved
in response to changes in the world economys structure. The foreign
reserve constraint so central under the gold standard or in the early
Bretton Woods years is less important under conditions of high interna-
tional capital mobility. Increasingly, the current account and the
national intertemporal budget constraint are emphasized in discussions
of international adjustment. In analogy with the idea of a high—
employment government budget surplus, a working definition of external
balance might be a current account that maintains the highest possible
steady consumption level consistent with the economys expected inter—
temporal budget constraint. Intertemporal approaches to external balance
become more difficult to apply when countries face credit rationingas a
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Introduction. International finance is concerned with the deter-
mination of real income and the allocation of consumption over time In
economies linked to world markets. Fundamental to international finance
is the somewhat elusive iaea of external balance, which In practice
entails a path of external indebtedness that does not threaten a
countrys ability to meet its international obligations. Because the
nature of the linkages among economies has varied across historical
episodes, the requirements of external balance have varied as well.
International finance studies the policies and market forces whichmay
lead to external balance under various conditions. The history of the
subject illustrates how the nature of world market linkages has itself
been changed by national efforts to cope with external constraints.
The national Income identity is the necessary groundwork forany
discussion of external balance. The national income of anopen economy
equals domestic product plus net factor payments from abroad plus net
international transfer payments; the current account equals net exports
of goods and services (including all net factor payments) plus net
transfers. If national expenditure is defined as the sum of consumption
and investment (by both the public and private sectors), the national
income identity asserts that national income less natiânal expenditure
equals the current account. When in surplus, the current account there-
fore measures the growth of the economy's external assets; when in
deficit, it measures the growth of external debt.—2—
TheClassicalParadigm.Theclassical Ricardo—Mill Dartertrade
theory shows how the terms of trade and international production pattern
are determined in a stationary world economy with balanced trade. The
classical analysis of •the transition to balanced trade say be viewed as
an account of the convergence process to the long—run barter equi-
librium. As Ricardo noted in the Principles (1811)1
Sold and silver having been chosen for the general medium of
circulation, they are, by the competition of commerce, distributed
in such proportions amongst the different countries of the world
as to accommodate themselves to the natural traffic which would
take place if no such metals existed, and the trade between
countries were purely a trade of barter.
Historically, however, the classical paradigm of external adjustment
preceded Ricardo. Major elements of the theory had been expounded quite
clearly by the early eighteenth century, but the most coherent and
effective exposition was given by Hume in 1752.
Hume assumed a world economy that settles trade imbalances ex-
clusively through imports or exports of precious metals that also serve
asmoney.Building on the quantity theory of money, he constructed a
fulldynamic model of the balance of payments and the terms of trade.
The famous price—specie—flow mechanism was put forth as an automatic
marketprocess that always works to restore balanced trade. Humes goal
was to refute mercantilist and protectionist arguments by showing that
market forces would ensure inthe long run a 'natural' distribution of
specie among countries.
Hume invited his readers to imagine that four—fifths of 6reat
Britains money supply were 'annihilated in one night.' British prices
would naturally fall1 he argued, cheapening British exportables relative
to foreign goods and creating a trade surplus..As a result of thissurtus Britain wouid accumul Ste fareicin west in tne tarn c sacie,
sceina ntsmoneySUpiy, and flonce itsprices,race.road, the dr.eln
ofspcie would lower oricec. Sritain a trare surogus woulc ciwincile an:
eventually disappear once its terms o trade hao lmproveOsu7icaentiy,
and at this point, the natural dlstributaon of specie woulu prevaii.
hypotheticalfIvefold ancrease in Britains money supplywould set off
thereverse process. involvinq an initial improvement in ritsinc terms
of trade and a trade balace deficit. Over time, specie would flow abroad
as the terms of trade deteriorated and external equilibrium was re-
stored.
There is litti exaggeration in saying that issues raised by Humes
analysis dominated writing in international finance up until the inter—
World War years. In a period that culminated in the classical gold
standard, it was natural to take as the benchmark of external balance an
absence of international specie movements. Hume had placed relative
price movements at the center of his account of how external balance
would be attained, but subsequent writers asked whether direct income or
wealth effects might also b operative, and whether external adjustment
could take place in some cases without price changes. Such questions
arose in the 1929 Keynes—Ohlin debate over the German transfer problem,
but as Viner (1937) showed, the questions had been raised much earlier.
A simple model of a Humean world makes apparent some oftheassump-
tions underlying the price—specie—flow mechanism. Such a model also
serves as a springboard for understanding later developments in the
analysis of external adjustment. (A more detailed exposition of a
similar model is given by Darnbusch, 1973, whose analytical approach is
however, somewhat different from that taken here,)
Assume a world of two countries, each specialized in the production-.4-
of a single commodity that is consumed in both countries. With given
supplies of capital and labor within each country and perfect wage
fiexiblity, floine—country output is fi::.ed at the fuil—emoloyment level x
and foreign—country output is fixed at y. Let q denote the price of y—
goods in terms of x—qoods (the terms of tradez domestic expenditure
measured in v—goods, and 2*foreignexpenditure, also measured in x—
good;. Then the domestic demands for the two goods are c(qz and
cq!Z),whilethe foreign demands arec*(q,z*) and c *(q,z*).
V A
Expenditureis determined by monetary conditions. The money sup-
plies M and M* are for simplicity taken to consist entirely of gold, and
P and P* denote the gold prices of home and foreign goods, respectively.
The exchange rate between domestic and foreign currency can be set at
unity with no loss of generality, so the terms of trade, q, equal P*/P.
In each country there is a desired long run (or natural") money supply
thatisproportIonal to nominal output, and saving behavior is governed
tydiscrepanciesbetween natural and actual money supplies. Because a
country; netsavinghere equals its current account, which byassump-
tionis settled in specie, saving behavior determines the evolution of
national monosupplies,These evolve according to the laws
= — ('1)d)i*/dt =*çX*Py — M*)
*. stne reciprocal of the home 'foreign) country a long—run
cronetarvvelocltv and 15 thehome (foreign) marqnal propensity
to ois;a•euut c ;onet.arv wealth. Expenditurelevels are therefore
=— e.x + z* =(I
-. + e*f'i*,p.
woro 5*x* I
The 5000115 closedby twoenuillbriLrn conditions. With a aiven—5—
world stock of monetary gold, ?,homesaving must equal foreign dissav—
ing, that is, world expenditure must equal world output. Inaddition,
the market for domestic goods must clear. By Walras'slaw, these two
equilibrium conditions imply equilibrium in te market forforeign
goods.





Equation (1) shows that, for given terms of trade andmoney supplies,
the world price level adjusts to maintainconsistency between the
countries saving plans. In equilibrium, this condition makesP a func-
tion of q and N, P tP(q,N),with
q IP —8*X*qy N $P (8 —8*91 ————
>—1,———a
>0. P$q Gix+8*X*qy P bM GlPx +Gfl*P*y
Themarket for x—goods clears when
(2) cCq,(l — 8X)x+GM/P]+c*[qs(l — 8*1*)qy+G*N*/P] x.
Substltutiânof PP(q,N) and Mt a p$W—N Into (2) gives the
curvedescribing combinations of N and q at which both goods markets
clear and aggregate world saving Is zero. Thecurve Is labelled XX in
Figure 1 and is shown with a negative slope. The assumptionsgiving rise
to this negative slope are crucial, for analyzing the Humeanadjustment
process. An increase in N (which necessarily implies an equal fall In
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FeM+ *t1*;
near the system 5 1 onq—run epu I ibri 'e her dM/dtoM*idt . Th
term c !z — Ic /Iz* is the difference oetween the twocountries x x
marqinal propensities to spendon home—countrygoods; if the home—
country marginal propensit 15 larger——the orthodox presumption jr
transfer analysisiEamueison, 1971)——a redistribution o nominal
balancesin favor of the home country creates an incipient excess demand
forits output. This excess demandis eliminated by a fall in q if the
home—goods market is Wairasstable, so XX slopes downward under standard
assmptions concerning marginal spending propensities and Walrasian
stabili ty.
Thecurve in Figure 1 labelled dM/dt =0 describes points at which
P1 =P(q,M)x.This locus has a negative slope algebraically smaller than
that of XX. With goods markets continuously inequilibrium the world
economy travels along XX to its long—run equilibrium at point A where
international prices and the distribution of specie give rise to
balanced trade.
In most respects the model confirms Humes account of theexternal
adjustment process. (small) fall in P1 to for example, leads to
terms of trade q, which are worse for the home country. Theterms—of—
trade change is a direct result of the transfer of purchasingpower to
foreigners, which produces an excess supply ofhomegoods at the initial
prices. The home balance—of—payments surplus that simultaneouslyemerges
causes a gradual redistribution of money in favor of the homecountry,
so the home terms of trade improve during the transition to external
balance.
If 8 =8*,equilibrium P is a function of q alone, with a negativeciasti C: tv preaterthen—1The rise in p caused bya failin P1 isthus
accoeoanie by a iess—than—pr000rtlonal fall inP and arise inP* that
arereversed as theeconomyreturns to point A.These results are in
accordwith Rumesprediction;,but they need not hold iftheexpendi-
ture responses to realbalancesdiffer sufficiently in the two
countries, if8 8*,a.transfer of money abroad raises world saving for
given termsoftrade, so P* may fall along with P and then rise during
the sLibsequent adJustment Likewise, if 88*,amoney transfer abroad
may reduce world savinq sufficiently that P must rise, along with P*, to
restore goods—market equilibrium in the short run. In this case, the
initial responseto thedisturbance is followed by price deflation in
both countries.
This stylized version of Humes paradiom may be used to analyze the
trensfer problem. Suppose that ownership of aportionof the foreign
country sendowmentistransferred to the home country. Does thehome
tradedeficitnecessarily increase by the amount ofthe transfer,oris
thetransfer undereftected, requiring aflew ofspecie to the home
country to balance nternatl oral accounts? A second focus of debate in
the literature is the possibility that the transfer impose; a secondary
;urden on trepayingcountry byaddingen equilibrium terms—of—trade
deterioration to toe primary income burden. ceynes and Bhlin clashed on
thispolntin 1929,wltnteynes arguing that the secanaarv burden is
nevtable
Toolify, suppose that8 = 8*and= *. Sincelong—run money
demand riSes 1ch income,the diii dt =locus shiftstothe right,
impivinothat the transfer isunderefctebandthat the worlds gold
;toc: 15redi stnihuted toward the name country. Underthe standard
assumptIon reoaro:nqmarg:nal spendIng propensities, toe transferalmacraatss. n -c2ssdenannor-noodsat tnsinitialtermsof trade sc
;n ft;do •ari . A secorlar' buroens thus i rpose on the payl r!Q
:ountrand this bnrciei worsens over tIme as balanced tradeisre—
e-stab1 shed
lhelnterarPerod. Inc years ostween treWorld Wars saw a partial
ann ultisately unsuccessful return to tne noid standards followed by
extensive experImentation with floatIng excnanoe rates and direct con-
trol s or,interna.tional ra sent; as means of attaining external balance.
Murxses (l94 account of the period is probably themost influential
one.Writers or international finance continued to conceptualizeexter—
naibalancein termsof reservemovements.The spread of the gold—
exchangestandard, under which central banks held asforeign reserves
currenciestied to gold as well as gold itself, broadened the class of
assets through which balance—of—payments deficits were financed.
InternatIonal capital movements were discussed increasingly in the
theoretical literature, but they were viewed for the most part as an
aOjunct to the c1as;cai balance—of—payments adjustment mechanism. The
theoretical discussions merely formalized a mechanism that had long been
exploited by the Bank of Engiano to regulate gold flows.country that
suddenly developed a trade deficit would face declining international
reserves, a declining money suprlv, and higher interest rates. Higher
interest rates would, however, attract foreign capital inflows and thus
dampenthe resulting fluctuations in the balance of payments. On this
view, interest—sensitive capital flows had a potentaily stabilizing
role to p1 ay ifl discouraging protracted reserve flows. Biven the tur-
bulent conditions of the pcrod, contemporary writers fully reconizen
that capital flows sotvated by fears of devaluation or political in--etabliitv cOuld lUSt aseildestmbilzean already cc-: external.nay—
aents poblem.
E;uct short—coreor nterest-sensi.tve capital movements were
qen'erallv discusses separately from "loop—term international capital
movements whichdirectlyfinanced investment or poverrinont expenditures.
Thooret cal discussions of 1 ong—tere capi tel movements focused mmmi y or
the transferharccn, the ealance—of —payments and terms—of—trade
adjustments that would accompanyaninter—countr trartster of capital.
Conspi cuously absent + rocn the I terature were attempts to develop a
normative intertemporal theory of international capItal transfer. Suc a
theory naturally would haveextended tne prevail inq external tual ance
conceptto comprise changes jrnations overall indebtedness rather than
iustchanqes 10thecentral bank's +oreiqn assets. It had been known, at
least sance Racaroo's Principles, that producers and consumers could
pain if lonq—tercn foreign investment equalized profits internationally.
The I nsi abt d d rot alter thi nk nq about the nature of external balance.
This pap in the literature is surprlsinq in view of the develop-
ments in international capital markets over the previous century. Huge
flows of long—term capital, primarily from Britain, had financed rail-
roadconstructIonanoother investment in the western Hemispnere. France
andGermany also made sgni+icant foreign loans. In the early l93Os
widespreadforeIgn debt default bytheLatin imerican countries high-
lighted the reed to analyze formally the sustaneb1 ii ty of external debt
paths. in the world assumed by Hume! specie flows had oeen the only'
meanscf settling current—account imbalances, ano a concept pf external
balancebased onbalance—of—payments equilibrium hal been defensible.
Such aconcept cf external balance was outmoded howEver in a world
where c,ther types 0+asset trade coulo -fi narcetne current account.in r1;sry chanqeofpersoectveoijnotoccurfor several
Occades.Instead,the events nd ideas cf the lnterwar nerod led i.ter—
national financial theory to turn away aitoqetner +ro the concern with
the dynamics ot international ad3ustment underlyinq the classical model.
Emonasi;shifted lnward, to the interaction between the balance of
payments and domestic economic conditions.
The Bretton Woods Period. The interwar experience had a profound
influence on both the institutional framework of postwar international
finance and the theoretical orientation of researchers. The interna-
tional agreement reached at Bretton Woods in 1944 set up a world trading
community linked by fixed dollar exchanqe rates, with a United States
commitment to peg the dollar price gold at $35perounce providing an
anchor for the world price level. The agreements provisions aimed to
promote free trade in goods, but private capital movements were viewed
as potentially disruptive and the widespread capital controls then in
force were not discouraged. A prevailing view that flexible exchange
rates had failed during the interwar period motivated the adoption of a
fixed—rate system. Provision was made, however, for infrequent exchange—
rate adjustment, after due consultation, in circumstances of 'fundamen—
tal disequilibrium in the balance of payments.
Central to the design of the Bretton Woods system was a desire to
avoid unemployment and ensure price—level stability. In the interwar
years, many governments had resorted to competitive currency deprecia-
tions and trade restrictions aimed at reducing domestic unemployment.
These Hbeggar_thy_neighbor moves made all countries worse off. Having
recently experienced the hardships of the worldwide Sreat Depression,
the Bretton Woods signatories recognized the goal of internal balance'——l 1—
—uil employment with price stability——as a key aim of government
policy. .n International Monetary Fund was set up to reconcile the goals
of internal and external balarce. It was hoped that the availability of
Fund credit would make it unnecessary for members to tolerate high
unemployment in pursuing external balance, or to interfere with trade
flows in pursuing internal balance.
in an environment of fixed exchange rates and extremely limited
capital mobility, the overriding external consideration for governments
was the available stock of foreign, particularly dollar, reserves. The
operative external target was therefore the acquisition of as many
dollars as possible throuah balance—of—payments surpluses. As the
reserve center, the United States enjoyed the privilege of being able to
finance its own balance—of—payments deficits by borrowing dollars from
foreign central banks. In reality, however, the United States was not
totally free of a reserve constraint. Foreign central banks could, and
din. use their dollars to buy gold from the U.S authorities at the
official price. The problem of gold losses became important as the
oostwar period of dollar shortage ended in the late 1950s. In 1960,
miffinputthe Americanexternal dilemma in its most somber light Once
+orelqn official dollar holdings exceeded trie official value of the U.S.
oddstock, itwould become impossible to satisfy all foreign claims to
U.S. qoid withouta rise in thedollar price of gold. The resulting
confidence problem, Triffin predlcteo, would undermine the stability of
theBretton Woodssystem.
s it developed immeoiatelafter Jorld War Ii, international
financialtheory reflected tne new institutional arrangements, along
with theec000cicassumptions LnderlvInn EvflCS s i3)diagnosisof
the unemployment of the i51ys.Toe newocradiqe, set fortn very e+fec—t1s1v b Mmtzer 194B, pa. 4I2—.l3, assucedstichypricelevels along
with fIxed e.:chanoe rates. .bus preciudintherelative—price adjust—
cents at the heart of tne classical paredgm wriiie onening the door to
employment fluctuatIons;
Inc important feature ofthe classical mechanism is the central
role itattributestothe monetary system. Theclassical theory
contains ar explicit acceptance of the Quantity Theory of Money as
well as an implied assumption that output and employment are un-
affected by international monetary disturbances. In other words,
the classical doctrine assumes that an increase or decrease in the
quantityof money leads to an increase or decrease in the aggregate
money demand for goodsand services, and that a change in money demand
affects prices and costs rather than output and employment.... The
essence of the new theory is that an external event which increases
a countrys exports will also increase imports even without price
charges, since the change in exports affects the level of output and
hence the demand for all goods. In other words, movements of output
arid employment play the same role inthenew doctrine that price
movements played in the old.
n increase in external demand for a. countrys exports, for example,
would raise the couatrys trade surplus in the first instance, but once
themultiplier effect of the disturbance had raised income and hence
importspending, the initial impact onthe trade balance would be
reduced. tletzier noted, however, that even if oneassumed thatinvest-
ment spending responds positively to a rise in real income, it was
unlikely that multiplier effects alone would ensure complete trade—
balance adjustment in the short run.
TheKeynesian account ofexternal adjustment therefore contained an
importantgap. Private capital movements were largely ruled out in the
Keynesian models, so incomplete trade—balance adjustment implied incom-
pletebalance—of—payments adjustment and growingor shrinking central—
bank foreign reserves. Inc models pushed monetary factors to the back—
qround implcitiy or exolicltlv assuming thatcentral—bank steriliza-
tion operations were ct+settinnany monetary effects of the balance ofoavments. Univ aof the early ostar theorists notablyMeaoe
l91 .assionedanmcortantrole to monetary factors.
Even i.fthesteriization assumption were granteo, however con—
siderati onofthe systems inherent dynamics made clear the ln—
feasability of a pareanent steriilzatiOfl policy. LountrIeswithpersist-
ent defIcitswould ultlmateiyexhaust their available international
reserves including IMF credit; and even surplus countries miqht be
unable to sterilize indefinitely ifdomesticfinancial markets were
thin. How, then, rould trade—balance equilibrium ever be restored after
a permanent external shock? Fiscal policy could be effective in situa-
tions where the needs of internal and external balance were both served
bythe same measure. In dilemma situations,however where fiscal
measures could move theeconomy toward external balance onlyat the cost
of increasingitsdistance from internal balance, the Fundamental
disequilibriumclauseof the IMF Articles ofAgreementcould beinvoked
andthecurrency devalued. Noautomaticmarket mechanism pushing the
economy toward balance—of—payments equilibrium was featured intheearly
postwar writing.
Ina series of remarkable napers publishedinthe early194Os
Mundeil revived the explicit dynamic analysis of international adjust—
sent. His models placed the monetary sector in the foreground.adopting
aKCyOCSIan Iquldlty--pre erence view of interest—rate determi nation
prescient paper yietzleri9bO) wrItten ataboutthesacetimEtook
asimilar approach.
dunici1s paperon The Internat.ional Dsequ IIriurSystem19a1
cr1tIci zBithe xevnEslan model-fail ure toaccounr for teovnsac
eacts of payments1 stalances. Even n a. evnesi an worlo hurdolI
arauad ar incone—specie—ilow mecnaismanalogous to iusss prica-—1 -i—
specis—flowsechanism. ensures 1 onq—runoalance—o+---pav(nents equi I Ibrium.
A-fivefold increase in a countrys money supply,-for example,
depressesdomestic Interest rates, stimulate; investment spendnq, and
creates a deficit in the balance of payments. As thecertra.l bankloses
reserve;, however, the interest rate gradually rises and reduces invest-
ment, the process coming to an end (for a small country) only when the
domestic money supply,theinterest rate, investment, and output have
returned to their oriqinal levels. The introduction of dynamic adjust-
ment made it clear that sterilization could have only limited success as
a policy response topermanent balance—of—payments di sturba.nces. One
sourceof dynamic effects, however, was not explicitly analyzed in
Mundelis work of the period. The omitted effect was the real—balance
effect on expenditure,central totheclassical account but possibly
relevant (as Pigou had shown) under Keynesian conditions as well.
Inline with the increasing international capital mobility that
followed the European move toward currency convertibility in 1958,
riundell gave the capital account a prominent role in his models. The
presence of capital mobility suggested a solution to the policy dilemmas
that could arise under fixed exchange rates when the goals of internal
and external balance appeared to conflict. Mundell showed that bygear-
ing monetary policy to external balance and fiscal policy to internal
balance3 governments could simultaneously attain both goals. The key to
the argument is the observation that monetary and fiscal expansion both
raise output but have different effects on the capital account, monetary
expansion causing capital outflows (by driving down the home interest
rate> and fiscal expansion causing capital inflows (by raising the
interest rate). With two independent instruments, both internal and
external policy targets can be attained simultaneously.—15--
While a major step forward, the Mundellian argumentfora policy
sixsufferedfromtwo drawbacks. First, the theoretical specification of
the capitalaccount as a function of international interest—rate levels
was weakitseemed unlikely that capital would flow at a uniform level
forever even if the interest dierential remained fixed. Missing was a
discussion of stock equilibrium in international asset markets. The
second problem with the policy mix was its definition of external
balance. Would any policymaker view with satisfaction a permanently high
interest rate that brought about balance—of—payments equilibrium by
crowding out domestic investment and encouraging a buildup of external
debt? Key considerations omitted from Mundeli s model vere the stock of
net foreign claims and the associated flows of interest payments. Mun—
dell himself (1968, p. 207) recogni2ed that in many contexts, the
definitionofexternal balance as balance—of—payments equilibrium might
be inadequate
Just as the composition of output is important (the division of
outputbetween investment andconsumptionaffectsadditional
growth tarqets) so an appropriate composition of the balance of
payments is a legitimate target of policy.
inoeed, in spite cfthecontinuing obligation to peg dollar ex—
changerates tnestandard definltlonof externalbalancewas becoming
ncreasingiyoutmodednythe late i90s Thebalanceof payments
rem-aireda legitimate conrerrq oi-course,n part because a large or
Oersistent I abmi ance mi oat ioaklIke fundamental disequ I brius to the
manor anc sn-ark: a specul atve attack: on the currency invol ve. But the
increasing i rtegrati an a-f nat anal financial markets——a deei c.pment
Oi tomi redutheoroxth of Eurocurrencv trading——weakened the aite Of
tue hal ance—o+—pavnients constraint, Jr arvpothetECI won o a-f pere:t—16—
capital mobility, a central bank short on reserves can (within limits)
bnrrow them from abroad at no net cost simply by contracting domestic
credit. Such an action, by causing an incipient rise in the home inter-
est rate, leads to an instantaneous private capital inflow and an offi-
cial reserve gain equal to the fall in domestic credit. The home Inter-
est rate, the money supply, output, and the national external debt are
unchanged in the final equilibriumi the central bank holds more foreign
assets and fewer domestic assets, while the home private sector, having
made the mirror—image adjustment, holds fewer foreign assets and more
domestic assets.
The case of perfect capital mobility is an extreme one that does
not fit the facts of the late Bretton Woods period. Nonetheless, the
opportunities for central banks other than the Federal Reserve to borrow
dollar reserves in the International capital market had grown since the
early 1960s. The situation facing the United States was quite different.
As the primary International reserve Issuer, its responsibility was to
peg the dollar price of gold, a responsibility that would have required
the gearing of U.S. monetary policy to that external commitment. In
spite of such expedients as the two—tier gold market established by
central banks In 1968, the U.S. did not succeed in preserving the
dollar's link to gold. Triffin had been right. After a series of violent
speculative attacks, the U.S. severed the dollar's gold link in August
1971 and in December 1971 devalued the dollar against major foreign
currencies. The patchwork system of fixed exchange rates proved un-
stable, and in the first months of 1973 the postwar period of floating
exchange rates began.
Floating Exchange Rates. The industrialized countries adopted float——17—
ing dollar exchange rates as an interim measure, but in fact a sig-
nificant body of economists had come to advocate floating rates by 1973.
Friedman's (1953) powerful case for flexible rates was the opening shot
in a campaign to revise the then—prevailing view, expounded by Nurkse
(1944), that the floating—rate experiments of the interwar years were
disastrous. By the time Johnson wrote his well—known polemic of 1969,
Friedman's views had gained many adherents.
The fundamental argument for floating rates was that they would
free governments of the balance—of—payments constraint and allow them to
use monetary policy to attain domestic economic goals. Equilibrium in
the balance of payments would be automatic if central banks simply
refrained from intervening In the foreign exchange market. At the same
•time, floating rates would permit central banks to target their nominal
money supplies without being frustrated by offsetting interest—sensitive
foreign reserve flows. Widespread restrictions on trade and capital
movements, motivated in part by a desire to impede reserve flows under
the fixed—rate regime, could be dismantled.
Subsequent experience was to provide only partial vindication to
the advocates of floating. In the decade after 1973, barriers to capital
movement were reduced to insignificant levels in many of the industrial
countries. This development helped spark unprecedented growth in inter-
national financial intermediation. Under the new exchange—rate regime,
however, policymakers became mere acutely aware that the traditional
definition of internal balance as full employment cum price stabilty
really involved two, quite distinct, goals. Under a floating exchange
rate4 monetary expansion aimed at domestic unemployment translates
immediately into currency depreciation, higher import prices, and
heightened inflationary expectations. Conversely1 a rapidly—adjusting•chanpe rate provides a powerful channel throupn hich nf I ati onary
expectationscan nave a direct and jemediate effect on inflationiflCfl
open econom. ny short—run tradeoff between inflation and urieeploycnent
wouldtherefare be lassfavorable under a floating rate. Floating rates
certairiv allowcountries tochoosetheir own trend inflation rates. But
itsoonbecame vidnt that if disturbances to the economy oriqinated
predominantly outside the money market, the inflationary cost ofusina
monetary policy to target employment could be quite high.
Sharpexchanqe—ratemovements might CISOhave adverse distribu-
tional effects in the economy andthese together with a desire for
price—levelstability, led central banks to intervene,attimes heavily,
intfle foreign exchange market. Correspondingly, the predicted drop in
centralbanks' demand forinternational reserves did not materialize
(although the composition ofreservesdid change over timeas the
deutschemarkand yenbecame important reserve currencies and the pound
sterling retreated). Central banks' use of foreign reserves tomanage
exchangerates did not necessarily imply anoperativebalance—of—
payments constraint, however, since in manycountriesthe sameexchange—
rateeffects could have been achieved at an unchanged reserve level
through domestic credit measures.
Under conditions of limited capital mobility, suchas those exist-
ing in the early 1950s when Friedman wrote, the automatic balancing of
international reserve paymentsbyafloatingexchangerateamounted
essentially to the automatic balancing of the current account. With
means other than reserve flows available to settle current—account
imbalances, however, there is no theoretical necessity for a floating
rate to balance the current account in the short run. Acurrent—account
deficit,say, can be financedentirely through dosestic borrowing abroad—19—
withnodecline in the central banks foreign assets. Experience was to
show that floatinQ exchange rates themselves could not prevent the
eaerqence oflargeand persistent current—account imbalances. Tiese
imbalances were problematic not only because they usually entailed
problems of shifting productive resources between the economys tradable
and nontradable sectors, but also because they implied changes infor—
eiqn debt and thus in sustainable future consumption levels.
ttention therefore shifted to the mechanism ofcurrent—account
adjustment under floating exchange rates and capital mobility, with
researchers askino., as Hume had, if market farces would automatically
push economies towardcurrent—account balance. The new.generation of
dynamicopen—economy models produced in the cid—1970sbuilt on anumber
of antecedents in the literature. Oneofthese was theneo—classical
monetary approach tothebalance of payments, which stressed the real
balance effect and the transition to long—run payments equilibrium.
(See, forexample,FrenkelandJohnson,1976.) The second important
antecedent wastheclosed—economy literatureon moneyand growth, which
had clarified the stock—flowdistinction in multi—asset models with
wealth accumulation. Building on the rational—expectations revolution in
macroeconomics, manymodel buildersendowed agents with-forward—looking
exchanae—rate expectations that playeda keyrole in clearing the asset
mar k e ta.
The intrinsicdynamic mechanism in these models is fueled by
wealth, broad Iv cief nod to inc uds not oniy real monetary balances, but
also -foreion assets and O55iblycapi tal , physi cal as weli ashuman.
cEme Uhst-fel and Stockm;r,l9BH for a aurvo, in line wIth the long—
run nature of thai nqui rv the ci asa cal condit ons a-f price
+1mxIbitIcy ano tui I employment warm qenaral y assumed giving a prduc—ti .n structure 5151 br to the HLrnCanmod2set out above. Where the
sodelsif+ereessenti cliv from Husaw intheder scectrum of
marketable•asets., and in the resultIng portfolio problem of private
agents. Eachpi yencon+ io.urctionoforl dassetstocks determines a
short—run epUllibrium defIned by the the requirement of market clearing
in assetaswellas goods markets,The resuitinp equilibrium wealth
levelsand real interest rates determinecorsumpti on levelsat homeand
abroad,but there is no necessary requirement of current—account balance
in theshort run goods—market equilibrium implies Oflithat one
countrys planned current—account surplus equals the other s planned
current—accountdeficit,The international adjustment process can now be
visualized. ll elseequal, the deficitcountry is running down its
wealth by borrowing fromabroad,so its consumption isfallingand
foreign consumption is risinc. Undertheothodox transfer criterion,
this redistribution of wealth between the countries causes the deficit
country's terms of trade to deteriorate over time; if anticipated, the
evolution of the term; of trade has further repercussions on world real
interest rates and expenditure levels. The process comes to an end once
the deficit countrys consumption has fallenintolinewithitsinrome
which islowerthan initially because oftheincreased interest burden
of the external debt. ( very similar adjustment process would take
place with mobile capital and a fixed exchange rate, but reserve move-
ments rather thanexchanqe—ratemovements would contribute to asset—
marketbalance during the transition to long—runequilibrium.)
This sieple picture o the adjustment process become; more comq1—
cated once domestic capital eccumulaton is allowed. W current—account
deficit say now Finance an investment boom in which the deficit
country s terms of trade imorove over time. Eventually, however, the—21—
international wealth—flow mechanism restores a balanced current account.
Further complications arise when the classical assumptions are dropped
and Keynesian price stickiness in output markets is assumed. In such
models, the approach to the long—run, full—employment equilibrium can be
oscillatory.
For a single economy with Keynesian features, there is an analogue
to the Nundellian Idea of using monetary and fiscal policy simul-
taneously to attain internal and external targets. Figure 2, which is
developed more fully in Obstfeld (1985, pp. 408—410), illustrates this
approach. The downward sloping internal—balance schedule shows combina-
tions of monetary and fiscal ease consistent with full employment. On
the assumption that monetary ease improves the current account by
depreciating the currency, the external—balance schedule, which shows
policy settings consistent with some current—account target, slopes
upward. The intersection of the two schedules shows how policies should
be set to achieve both of the government's goals in the short run.
Even if one leaves aside the complex game—theoretic problems sur-
rounding interactions between expectations and policy, the usefulness of
the above framework as a normative guide is limited by its failure to
incorporate some key dynamic elements. If the government can hit its
targets only by running a budget deficit, its fiscal stance must even-
tually be reversed if the government debt is to be serviced. In addi-
tion, the policy equilibriam shown in Figure 2 may Imply a domestic
investment rate that is socially sub—optimal. Finally, the framework
itself gives no guidance as to the appropriate external—balance
criterion. The balanced current account reached in the hypothetical
long-run equilibrium of a stationary world economy may be far off the









EXPANSIONthe theory of internationalfinance has made partial progress inad-
dressing these issues
The Intertemporal Analysis of External Balances In the 1980s, it
became increasingly common to analyze the dynamic behavior of open
economies in terms of the intertemporal maximization hypothesis applied
by Fisher (1930) to the theory of saving and investment, As usuai this
trend was the result of both new theoretical approaches in macro-
economics generally and of economic events that existing open—economy
models seemed ill—equipped to analyze.
Lucass (1576) influential critique of econometric policy evalua-
tion was important in motivating the intertemporal approach. Lucas
arguedthatthe standard econometric models of the time would generally
rot oe invariant to policy changes. Because the parameters estimated
were not the deep parameters describing preferences or technology but
instead reflected both deep structure and the policy environment
prevailing over the estimation period! the models could not he used to
analyse ch&nqesifl theoiicv environment. LucSSsanalysissuggested
tflat more reizable policy conclusions sight oe drawn from open—economy
soeis if demand and supply functions were derived from the optimal
decision rules of maximizing households and firms
Further impetus to develop an ntertemporal approach came from
events intheacrid capital market, particularly theznteraatlonal
catternc-f current accounts -fallowing tne sharp ci i--price ccreeses of
1i i—i4 ann19./S-Si.I hedivergent Datterns o current—account ed3ust—
sent bvindustri ciizEh ann ievelooinor o;intri os rcsed the innerently
p ot c-r -:ergtie Cot cr ess:sJ
sho:(s,Nez ther classical nor .eynes ian transter analysis oered cryreilable ouadanc.e or this question. SmiIar1v, the epicsion in bank
lendna to deVe1QPnQcountriesatter the first oil shok sparkedfears
ttatsoee coLntres e:terna1 oebt burdens ouid become unsustalnabie.
nesuto asses; deveioo ng—country debt levels againled naturallyto
the notionofan intertemporally optimal current—account deficit.
Any intertemporal analysis of externalbalancemust begin by
specifyingtrimeconomytechnological and market opportunities for
shifting consumptIon over time. These opportunities are described by the
mconomys intertemporal budget constraint, which specifies the terms on
which the economy can borrow or lend abroad, as well as the domestic
investment technology. Separate analysis of the public and private
sector's budget constraints illuminates the link between the public
finances and external imbalance, as measured by the balance of payments
or bythecurrent account. The economy—wide budget constraint results
from consolidation of the public— and private—sector constraints.
Assume for simplicity that a single good is consumed and produced
on each date, and consider the position of a small open economy that can
borrow or lend internationally at the real interest rate p. For each
date t, the government of the economy chooses a level of real government
consumption, g(t), and a (possibly negative) level of real transfers to
the priveite sector, 7(t). The government finances its outlays by issuing
debt, by printing money, and by drawing on the interest paid by the
central bank'sforeign reserves. (For present purposes, the central
bank.'s budget best is viewedas a component of the governments budget.
Lethkt) denotereal government bone holdings (cither than central—bank
foreignreserves;, D(t the money value of central—bank, domestic credit,
P(t the •onev price level and r t) real foreion reserves. if the
governmentpays the interest ratep onits domestic debt (_bb(t), then—24—
the path of government bond holdings satisfies the equation:
(3) db6(t)/dt =(b6(t)+r(t)]+£l/P(t)]dD(t)/dt—g(t)—itt).
Changes in the economy's money supply, P19(t), result from changes
in the central bank's foreign or domestic assets. If the world price
level Pa is constant (so that proportional changes In Pit) equal propor-
tional changes in the exchange rate), then the central—bank balance—
sheet identity implies dN9(t)/dt =P(tfldr(t)/dt]+dD(t)/dt.Let m(t)
denote the private sector's desired real money balances and sit) the
home inflation rate. On the assumption that the money market is con-
tinuously in equilibrium, mit)H9(t)/Pit) and equation (3) becomes
(4) d(b6(t) +r(t)1/dt=
pCb8(t)+nt))+i(t)m(t)+(dm(t)/dt3—g(t)—ytti.
Integrate (4) forward from t =0and Impose the condition
limt4exP(—Pt)tb9(t) +nt)]0, which restricts the government to
borrowing paths such that the public debt is asymptotically paid off.
The result is the intertemporal budget constraint of the government1
J'(g(t) +vtt)]exp(—pt)dtS
:;citt)m(t) +dm(t)/dt]exp(—pt)dt+b6(0)+riO).
The inequality states that the present value of net government
outlays must be less than the present value of th! seigniorage from
money creation plus the government's intial asset position. The latter
quantity, in turn, equals central—bank foreign reserves less the public
debt. For a world of perfect capital mobility, the constraint makes
clear that it is the government's overall asset position that is
relevant for assessing solvency. The level of foreign reserves r(O) has-25-
little s-iqn$canin itse. lsnotedearlier,the central bank can
incresse its reserves by sell jog other qoverneent assets (thus reducing
b(O.ibyar amount equal to the rise in reserves. The transaction
reauires no chanqe in the path of planned government outlays, g(ti +
7(t
Considernext the private sector. Let b(t) denote net private real
bond holdings and k(t) real capital holdings.(Byassumption capitals
real price equals unity.)Foreignersdo not hold domesticmoney or
capital, althouqh the analysis could easily be modified toaccount for
thesepossibilities. Biven aninelasticlabor supply normalized atunity
and a neo—classical production function x[k(t),t] private—sector assets
obey the equation
(5)dtb(t)+ kCt)÷ a Ct) 3/dt
x[k(t),t) +pb(t)+T(t) — c(t)—1T(t)m(t).
Define investment i(t) asdk(t)/dt.The sum of (4) and (5) is
dEb(t) +b6(t)+r(t)]/dt=
x[k(t),t]+pEb(t)+b6(t)+r(t)]-c(t)-i(t)-
Thesum b(t) +b6(t)+r(t)will be denoted by f(t); f(t) equals the
economys overall net claims on the rest of the world. Integratedfor-
ward and combined with the condition hat exp(—pt)f(t) i 0, the above
equation implies the economys overall intertemporal budget constraint,
(6) ,c{c(t) +1(t) + g(t)—xEk(t)t]}exp(—pt)dt￿ f(0).
(The same constraint is relevant when the private sector is prohibited
from transacting in the world capital market, but the paths ofconsump-
tion, investment, and output would generally change H such a prohibi—tlon were moosed.
Inequality 4) states that the present value of the economys
expenditures cannot exceed the present value of output plus initialnet
external assets. Alternatively (6) constrains the present value of the
economys trade balance deficits to its initial foreign asset stock. The
initial foreign asset stock thus limits the economys ability to main-
tain absorption levelsin excessof output.
An implicatior! of the analysis is that the most appropriate in-
dicator cf flow disequilibrium in external transactions is the change in
the economy s overall external assets——the current account. A surplus in
the balance of payments may indicate low domestic credit expansion or
growing domestic money demand; but when the government has unilimited
access to the world capital market, a growing stock of foreign reserves
is in itself, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a
soundexternalposition. Only when the domestic government and private
sector cannot borrow abroad does the balance of payments equal the
change in external claims.
The important consequences of current—account flows do not imply
that external balance and current—accountbalance are the same. In
analogywxth the idea of a high—employment government budget surplus,
external balance could be defneb roughly asa currentaccount that
maintains the highest possible steady consumption level consistent with
the economy s expected intertempora.i budget constraint. (A more exact
definition wouldrequirea more explicit treatment of t.re preferences of
householdsandthe government. Temoorarv unfavorablemovements in
outputworld interest rstes crthe terms of trade are aporopriately
oi+satdy temporary cx rrent—account de+ mi ts4hiIc temporary surpluses
arean appropriate responseto temporary favorable shocks. E;;ternaltian:e intfle lacE? 0+ aperirarient shock. nowever eneral lv reouirea a
rapid a0Ju?iUnEnt tocL?rrent—accourttEqLIIior1L?m.
1aiiarl,increasiflthe productivityofinvestc'entcanJustily
.3r-jrrent—accnn- ef i cit that15fullyconsistent witn external balance
Ifla Ionq-run SEnse. In terms of euat ion ,a technological innova-
tion implying a graouai upwarj shift of the production function
x[k(t,t) generates higher levelsOf consumption and investment, and
thus an initial current—account deficit. The ability to borrow abroad
prevents the sharp rise intheinterest rate and drop in consumption
that would occur initially in a.closedeconomy a higher investment
level than under intertemporal autarky is supported by the foreign
capital inflow, As productivity growth returns to normal, investment
falls and current—account balance is restored with consumption and
output at permanently higher levels.
These points car be made graphically in terms of a two—period
Fisherian model (see Figure 3). The axes measure amounts of the two
goods available, present and future consumption, and the indifference
curves show preferences over those goods. Investment opportunities are
described by the production—possibilities frontier, which indicates the
amount of future con;umpton obtained from a given input of present
consumption. With the opportunity to borrow abroad at an interest rate
p,theeconomy chooses to invest at point A and consume at ooint B, both
of these paints lying on the economys budget line, which has slope —)l
4 p;.l3ivenpreferences and technology, t is optimal for this economy
to run a first—period current—account deficit egual to the horizontal
di stance between B and A in per ladtwo,the country runs a surplus to
repayitsearlier borrowing. External balance thus entails an initial








countries whse autarky interest rates are less than the equiiibrium
worldrate pThe model is a parable of the development process.
Whendistortionsin the economy cause the actual current account to
diverqe from itsoptimallevel. governmentsmay find it appropriate to
adopt policIes, such as taxes orsubsidies on capital movement, that
movethe economy closer to the ideal external balance. Policies that
operate directly on the distortions in question (if these canbeiden-
tified) will, as usual, be best. Interesting problems arise when the
countries being analyzed are large enough that their governments can
affect world real interest rates (and other world prices) through their
actions. In this situation, the normative guidelines offered by the
above approach are not directly applicable to policy analysis3 and
governments instead condition their actions on the conjectured responses
of other governments. ANash—Cournotequilibrium, in which each govern—
meat maximizes over policy settings taking as given the policies of
other governments, will in general be Pareto—inefficient from a global
viewpoint. When governments recognize their policy interdependence,
welfare in each country can be improved though policy cooperation. The
practical difficulty lies in the negotiation process through which all
parties agree to choose a particular point on the world contract curve.
Sovereign Borrowing and Credit Constraints. The intertemporal
analysis of external balance sketched above assumes a world in which
individuals or at least governments can borrow unlimited amounts in the
world capital market, subject only to their interteniporal budget con—
striats. Individual and sovereign borrowers alike however, often
appear to face binding credit constraints as a result ofnonrepayment
risk. After the early 1980s, the extreme difficulty formany in——29—
dustrializinq countries of tapping world credit markets focused atten-
tion on how countries' borrowing possibilities are affected by the
possibility of sovereign debt default. The problem is a central one
because most developing—country debts are either contracted drect1y by
governmentagencies or are government—guaranteed.
Eaton ard Gersovit: (1981) presentedthefirst explicit analysis of
thesovereign repudiation problem in an international setting. Claims on
sovereign debtors are usually not legally enforceable3 so the analysis
of sovereigndefault cannot be conducted in terms of bankruptcy laws
that governcases of individual default. Eaton and Gersovitz
hypothesized that a sovereign debtor defaults whenever the present
discounted benefit of doing so exceeds the present discounted cost.
Potential lenders understanding the debtor's decision rule, will never
lend so much that a sure incentive to default is created. ccordingly,
sovereign borowers will in general find themselves credit—rationed,
unable to borrow as much as they would like at the interest rate quoted
by lenders.
There are several potential costs of sovereign default.default-
ing countrys external assets, such as foreign reserves or goods in
transit, can be seized. The country could, in addition, find itself
unableto borrow in the futurein response to unexpected changes in Its
income or tecMnoiogy. Continuedparticipation inthe world trade and
paymentssystem iniqht become infeasible altogetner.
ThiswlliInqnessto pay nypotnesls has raicaiimpiicatonsfor
tJieanalysis ofexternalbalance. The borrowing country snown in Figure
3, for examrle would repudaate its oreigr debt if thataction were
costless,thus avoloing tneresource transfer it would otnerwise have to
mcxcthe second pen od s aresult• period—nneborrewinc would taxeplace ata cJuntrv—soeo1ic interestratereflecting the probability of
oafeul t, wcr the extent o±borrown I isi tedbythemaret s estImate
01da+ault casts. t Interest rates so hiqh tbatdefaultwas certain, no
iend1rat au would occur.
Theanalysis of external balance becoces much morecomplex in such
a setting. Not only s the allowable current—account deficit more
severely circumscribed; in addition, the policymaker must consider how
various policy actionswillaffect the costs of default and hence the
availability of foreign credit. Trade liberalization measures that move
the economy away fromanautarkic production allocation increase the
cost of default by making the economy more vulnerable to disruption of
its foreign trade. Such measures will therefore ease international
credit constraints at the same time as they improve the static alloca-
tion of national resources. Conversely, trade restrictions aimed at
improving the current account may well reduce a countrys creditworthi-
ness.
The traditional balance—of—payments target has a rationale if the
government believes that foreign credit lines may disappear unexpec—
tedly There is then a case for holding precautionary reserves to
finance current—account deficits that may become necessary at times when
credit happens to be tight or nonexistent. The same purpose would be
served, however, if foreign assets held by government agencies other
than the central bank were run down at such times.
Internal and external balance may be irreconcilable for countries
ttat seek to continue external debt service in the face ofsevere
limItations on -forexgn borrowing. fter the early 1980s, many developing
countries were able to obtain external finance only through forced
banklending orchestrated by the IMF and central banks Measures toreduce current—account ef 1CitsinI iflEwitfl thexternal +urds avail—
ablecand ifllinewith IMF stabilizaticn tarqets pushed many economies
Intodeep recession. oftaiswriting, itis unclear how long .t will
remain politically feasible for debtor governments to downplay internal—
balance goals in order to continue avoiding efault. There are
increasingly—trequent call; for some form of debtrelief. Such proposals
amountto the cx post indexation o+ debt contracts to adverse contin—
qercies that were not entirely under the debtors control.
Thedebt crisis of the 1950s has raised deep and serious questions
about thetype;of asset; traded between developed and developing
countries. Before the debt crisis, thetypical loan contract between
banksand developing—country borrower; was indexed only to theLondon
Inter—Bank Offered Rate, and not to other factors that might alter the
borrowers ability to repay. Trade between developed anddeveloping
countries in a wider spectrum 0+ state—contingentassetswould improve
theinternational allocation of risk, andthus help to avoid future debt
crises. greater share for equity in settling current—account im-
balances is one possible step in this direction. Such reform; would not
eliminate the sovereign—default problem entirely, nor would they
eliminate the moral—hazard problem emphasized by critics of debt—relief
proposals. The possibility of a widespread and synchronized default
coul a oe sharply reduced, however unaer innovatl ye eternel financing
a r ran a, em eats.
Tnc structure of nternatloaal financial irtermedati onalso has
i5fl iIcation; for themutual adust;ent process 0+ industrialized
countres. Current—account i ebal ances are only one avenue throuqn whI ch
countrl as can ma?ntan ion g—run consumption Ievei 5 ifitileface of real
acome+I uctuati ons or chance; in investment orocuct lvi t i ml I ar—32—
consumption—smoothing can be obtained with smaller current—account
imbalances, however, if there is a greatmr degree of international
portfolio diversification. Lucas (1982), for example, models a world of
two exchange economies with perfect International risk sharing in which
consumption levels can be perfectly correlated internationally even
though current—account Imbalances never take place. The problem of
external balance thmref ore never arises in Lucas's idealized setting. In
reality, the extent of international portfolio diversification seems to
be much smaller than plausible financial models of an integrated world
capital market would predict. Why this should be so Is a major empirical
puzzle, and a problem for policy as well.Re f e ren cc;
Dornbusch, F, (1973).CurrencyDepreciation, Hoarding, and Relative Prices,"
journal of Political Economy, July/August.
Eaton,J. , andM. Gersovitz. (1981>. "Debt with Potential Repudiation:
Theoretical and Empirical Aspects," Review of Economic Studies,
Apri I.
Fisher, 1. (1930). The Theory of Interest, New York, Macmillan.
Frenkel, J.A.and H.6. Johnson, editors. (1976). The Monetary Approach
to the Balance of Payment;, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
Friedman, N. (1953). 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in Essays
in Positive Economics, Chicaqo, University of Chicago Press.
Hume 0. (1752). "0+ the Balance of Trade," in Essays Moral, Political ,and
Literary,London,Longmans Green, 1898.
Johnson, H.G. (1969). "The Case for Flexible Exchanqe Rates, 1969,"
FederalReserveBank of St. Louis Review, June.
Keynes, J.M. (1936). TheGeneralTheory of Employment Interest and Money,
London, Macmillan.
Lucas, R.E. ,Jr.(1976). "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"
in The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, edited by K. Brunner
and A.H. Meltzer, Amsterdam, North—Holland.
1982:. ulnterest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two—Country
World," Journal of Monetary Economics,November.
Meade,J.E.(i9i). TheBalanceof Payments.London,OxfordUniversity
Press.
Metzler, L. A:. (1948).The Theory of International Trade," inA Surveyof
ConteoraryEconomics, editedb H.S, Ellis, Philadelphia, Blakiston.
19b01.'The Process of international Adjustment under Condition;
ofFullEe,p(oy;ent: AKeynesianView,'inReadinqs in International
Economics. ecitcu by R,E, Cavesa.noH.BJohnson,Homewood,Irwin,
inie1l.RA. 1c61h 'ftc Iriternasoial Disequilibriuc.E;tec," in
lflterflCt?oflOiEconocic;, Paew york., Nacmillan 19a8.
.The Nature of Pci icy Choice; 'in internati on-el
Econceics, New York. Moccnllan.
Nurkse,F. ilP44 . Internatonal Curronc'v E.perence:__Lessons of the
intcr—wa.r Period, ereva, LeaquC 0+ Nations.
—
0stfei d 1.I25; .Fioatng Eicano.a Rote;: Experience ano Prospects
Brookinaperson Ec:onc'mic Activity, 2.34—
Jbstield, M an H.C. Stock;ran.i1985.iuE.rnan.Fr_Dvnaacs, jr
Handooo o-f internatonai Econci Cs, eoi ted by R W Jones and P. B.
eran.rsterdas. North-oliand.
Li.18 i7 .Tue Principlesof PoiitcaiEconomyand Ta>ation
London, 3.M. Dent & Sons! 1911.
Sa.euelson, P.A. 1971). "On the Trail ofConventionalBeliefs about the
Transfer Problern inTrade,Balance ofPaynierts, andBro,th, editedby J.N Bhaqwati et. al. rnsterdam. Nortn-Hoiiand.
Triffin, R. 156i). Goldandthe Dollar Crisis! New Haven, Yale University
P r e ss.
Viner, 3. ti.937). Studies in the Theory of International Trade, New York,
Harper & Brothers.